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Or. It. 

On 13 March 1981, the European Parliament referred the motion for a 
resolution tabled by Mr SUTRA and others on taxes applicable to wine (Doe. 
1-18/81) pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure to the Committee on 
Agriculture as the committee responsible. 
At its meeting of 1/2 June 1981, the Committee on Agriculture decided 
to draw up a report and at its meeting of 20 October 1981 appointed Mr Giosue 
~ 
LIGIOS rapporteur. 
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 24 September 1982 
and 1/2 February 1984. 
At the Latter meeting, it adopted the motion for a resolution by 26 votes 
to 2 with 2 abstentions~ 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Curry, chairman; Mr FrUh, 
Mr Colleselli and Mr Delatte, vice-chairmen; Mr Ligios, rapporteur; Mr Abens 
~eputizing for Mr Woltjer>, Mr Barbagli <deputizing for Mr Diana), Mr Bocklet, 
Mrs Castle, Mr Dalsass, Mrs Desouches, Mr Gatto, Mr Gautier, Mr Goerens 
(deputizing for Mrs Martin), Mr Helms, Mr Herman <deputizing for Mr Clinton), 
Mr Kaloyannis, Mr Kaspereit, Mr Kirk, Mr Maffre-Bauge, Mr Mertens, Mr Newton 
Dunn (deputizing for Mr Hord), Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Papapietro, Mr Provan, 
Ms Quin, Mr Simmonds, Mr Stella (deputizing for Mr Tolman), Mr Thareau 
and Mr Vitale. 
At the sitting of 13 March 1984, the report by Mr LIGIOS was referred 
back to committee pursuant to Rule 85<2> of the Rules of Procedure. 
At its meeting of 20/21 March 1984, the Committee on Agriculture 
reconsidered the report and adopted the amended motion for a resolution 
by 19 votes in favour with 4 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Curry, chairman; Mr FrUh 
and Mr Colleselli, vice-chairmen; Mr Ligios, rapporteur; Mr Barbagli 
<deputizing for Mr Diana), Mr Battersby, Mr Bocklet, Mr Dalsass, Mr Eyraud, 
Mr Gatto, Mr Gautier, Mr Helms, Mrs Herklotz, Mr Hord, Mr JUrgens, 
Mr Maffre-Bauge, Mr Maher, Mr McCartin (deputizing for Mr Clinton), 
Mr Mertens, Mr Provan, Mr Thareau, Mr Vgenopoulos and Mr Vitale. 
The report was tabled on 23 March 1984. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicatedc in 
the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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A 
The Committee on Agriculture hereby submits to the European 
Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory 
statement: 
on the taxation of wine 
Ih~-~~rQQ~~o_Q~r1i~m~o!, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Sutra, 
Mr Gatto, Mr Fotilas, Mrs Cresson, Mr Arfe', Mr Cariglia, 
Mr Georgiadis and Mr Coutsocheras <Doe. 1-18/81), 
- having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities of 12 July 1983 in Case 170/78, concerning 
the tax arrangements applicable to wine 1, 
- having regard to its resolution of 17 November 1983 on the 
harmonization of taxation in the Community2, 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture 
<Doe. 1-1374/83>, 
- having regard to the second report of the Committee on Agriculture 
<Doc.1-48/84), 
A. whereas consumers in certain non-producer Member States are 
disadvantaged by the fact that wine is subject to indirect taxes 
which make it a Luxury product and make its consumption prohibitively 
expensive by comparison with other natio1ally produced alcoholic 
beverages such as beer, 
B. whereas this situation has unfavourable effects both on consumer 
choice and on the functioning of the common organization of the 
market in wine, with significant consequences for the Community 
budget, 
C. whereas in its judgment in the abovementioned Case 170/78, the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities stated that the 
application to still white wines made from fresh grapes of excise 
duty at a higher rate, in relative terms, than that applicable 
1 
2 
to beer constitutes a failure to fulfil the obligations imposed 
on the Member States by Article 95<2> of the EEC Treaty, 
OJ No. C 226, 24.8.1983, p.3 
OJ No. C 342, 19.12.1983, p.73 
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o. whereas the recent decisions by the United Kingdom Government 
represent an important first step towards reintroducing the 
notion of equity into the systems of taxation applicable to wine 
and beer, 
1. Notes that the difference in per capita wine consumption- which 
• 
varies from between 2 litres a year in Ireland to about 90 litres 
a year in France and Italy - is due in part to the high excise 
duties; 
2. Stresses that in some countries taxation often puts the price of even 
the most ordinary table wine beyond the reach of the average consumer; 
3. Stresses that this policy cannot be justified even on budgetary grounds, 
since the revenue from excise duties on wine is insignificant as a result 
ut its Limited consumption; 
4. Po1nts out 1urthermore that this taxation of wine has unfavourable 
consequences for consumers, who are unable to purchase greater quant1t 1e~ 
of this product becuuse of its high price, for producers, who are excluded 
by fiscal barriers from a large part of thE Community market, and for tl1e 
Community budget, which is burdened by surpluses caused by the restrictions 
on the free movement of the product; 
5. Shares the Court ot Justice's view that there is a close competitive 
relationship between wine and beer in that the two beverages are capable 
of meeting identical needs and there is a degree of substitution for one 
another; 
6. Notes, however, that in some Community countries the tax burden on w1ne is 
greater than that on beer, whichever of the three possible methods of 
comparison is used - the volume, alcoholic strength or price of thP product; 
7. Stresses that this system of taxation creates distortion of 
competition and is obstructive to the completion of the internal 
market when, as the Court of Justice points out, the tax policy of 
a Member State must not crystallize given consumer habits so as to 
consolidate an advantage acquired by national industries concerned 
to respond to them; 
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8. Welcomes the ruling of the Court of Justice in Case 170/78, 
whose aim was to bring national Laws governing excise duties 
on Light still wines into Line with Community Law and calls 
on the governments concerned to comply with this ruling; 
- -- --- --
9. Stresses the importance of the authority of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities and its fundamental role as regards the 
respect of Community Law by the Member States, who joined the 
European Economic Community of their own free will; 
10. Considers that the Court's judgment and the Rogalla report on the 
harmonization of taxation in the Community1, as well as the 
numerous resolutions by Parliament condemning high excise duties 
on wine, show the need to seek a solution to this problem in 
the harmonization of the various tax systems; 
11. Calls therefore on the Commission to submit as quickly as possible 
new proposals for harmonizing the taxation of all alcoholic 
products, taking account of the conclusions reached by the Court 
of Justice; 
12. Welcomes the fact that the United Kingdom has taken an important 
first step towards complying with the ruling of the Court, by 
reducing the excise duty on a bottle of wine by 18p; 
hopes that other Member States will also take action to eliminate 
fiscal discrimination affecting alcoholic beverages; 
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council 
and Commission of the European Communities and the European 
consumer organizations. 
1 Doe. 1-903/83 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Excise duties are an indirect tax levied on the production or sale of a 
commodity, which producers and retailers pass on by raising consumer prices. 
Excise duties now represent one of the principal obstacles to the free 
movement of some goods, particularly when they are used as an indirect tax 
levied on certain products in or~er. ~o favour other products. The 
most conspicuous instance of this discriminatory ~se of excise duties 
is without doubt that of wine. 
The pu~pose of this report is to bring to the attention of the European 
Parliament and of European public opinion a problem which is serious 
not only in legal terms, but also, and above all, because of the conse-
quences which for too many years have affected European producers and 
consumers. 
The fact that per capita consumption of wine varies from 90 l a year 
in certain Member States (for example, France and Italy) to only 8 l 
a year in the United Kingdom and a mere 2 l in Ireland, that is between 
around twelve and more than fifty times less, is explained not only 
by the differing tastes and traditions of certain nations - tastes 
and traditions which are universally recognized and which no-one wishes 
to eliminate or change. 
o~e of the causes of this substantial disparity in consumption must 
be sought in the excise duties which certain Member States use to give 
an excessive competitive advantage to beer <an alternative drink to 
wine) and hence to make wine pro~~bitively expensive. 
In certain countries, in fact, excise duties increase the price of 
wine to such an extent that it becomes a luxury product that can be 
afforded only by the ~o~t well-to-do. This is one of the most questionable 
!orms of discrimination, particularly when it is practised in certain 
major countries whose consumer associations are among the most powerful 
and h1ghly organized in Europe, both ~ithin and outsid~ the Community. 
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1n addition to the high rate of excise duty the consumer price is further 
increased by VAT, which is levied at varying rates (from 5% to 25%> 
and leads to discrimination between products. 
The Co.-unity has removed customs barriers and facilitated the free 
movement of most agricultural products but has failed in its objective 
in the case of wine, which does not circulate freely in the Community 
in the same way as the other products. 
It is therefore rash to refer to wine surpluses, given that more than 
one hundred million European consumers are obliged to pay a price for 
wine which is between five and ten times higher than that obtained 
by the wine-growers. 
This type of situation obviously creates surpluses, a term which would 
be appropriate only if the forces of supply and demand were allowed 
to interact freely. 
The fact that it is precisely those Member States which boycott the 
sale of wine that oppose d1still•tion measurE·s- the only way of 
disposing of millions of hectolitres which are unsaleable- shows the 
absurd point that has now been reached in this sector. 
A further consequence of the high level of excise duties is that, in 
order to lower the selling price, an attempt is made to squeeze the 
producer price, thus encouraging the marketing of poor quality wines 
and thwarting the Community's aim of improving quality. 
The limited consumption in certain Community countries, resulting from 
the high price of wine, has, together of course with other factors, 
led to the formation of wine surpluses which can be disposed of only 
by means of expensive distillation operations. 
The claim made by countries which levy high excise duties on wine that 
a reduction in these duties would elad to a fall in revenue is groundless, 
since revenue from wine represents a very small proportion of total 
revenue from the principal excise duties and a specific cut in the 
rate could lead to an increase in revenue encouraging higher consumption. 
PE 79.978/fin • .l.. 
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D 8 F 1 Dl< 1RL UK L Nl 
Wine 1 3 1 - 4 1 3 2 2 
Beer 2 6 0.7 1 16 24 13 4 1 
This shows clearly that the Member States which.levy the highest excise duties 
on wine (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark) are those with the greatest 
revenue from beer, which is consumed in larger quantities. Hence a cut in 
the excise duty on wine could undoubtedly lead to an increase in revenue. 
The European Parliament has frequently denounced this situatio~ Now it is 
for the first time since direct elections tackling it in a specific report 
devoted exclusively to the problem. This comes at a delicate point when 
a decision is awaited from the Court of Justice which should bring to a 
close a lengthy dispute - Case 170/78 - between the Commission and the United 
Kingdom. 
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• 
TAXATION ON WINE 
A - General conslderations 
Domestic fiscal legislation is one of those sectors which has 
remained completely under the control of the national authorities 
and over which the influence of the camrunity continues to be 
extrerrely li.rrited. 
1he expansioo in recent years of the national budgets has 
compelled the Member States to increase substantially both 
direct and indirect danestic taxation. All of them, ooreover, 
are making increasing use of the fiscal levy as an instrument 
of econanic policy. 
Although all matters relating to taxation lie within the 
jurisdictior. of the States, it should not be forgotten that 
the Carmuni t y has a certain uurrber of objectives, the 
realization of which depends in part on a measure of 
harnoni zatio:: of the various taxation systems. Tax 
harmonizatio;. has a bearing on all the fundamental goals 
and d:>jecti•!es of the Treaty, especially those relating to: 
- the establ1shment of a common market, in particular 
through freedan of rroverent for persons, goods, services 
and capital and the introduction of mecha11isms to ensure 
chat campe~~tion is not ~storted within the common market, 
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- t~ progressive approximation of Member States' econorrcic 
J;X)licies, and 
- the establishment of a number of common policies. The 
Treaty provides for ooly three such policies ~for external 
trade, agriculture and transport), but others have been 
adopted, at least in principle, by the Community institutions, 
notably in the energy, region.;tl J;X)licy and environmental 
sectors. 
The measures already taken and yet to be taken by the Catrnunity 
with a view to harmonizing tax legislation have to be 
considered in relation to the achievement of these objectives. 
It is also worth noting the Council resolution of 22 March 
19711 , which specifies, inter alia, that: 
'In order to expedite the effectjve relaxation of the 1-ules 
applicable to the free rroverrent of persons, goods, services and 
capital and the process of economic interpenetration, the 
Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and with due 
regard for the need to achieve a just balance, shall decide 
on the following: 
- the CanTIJT.lty cr1teria for determining the uniform basis 
for assess1ng value added tax in conformity with the 
Decision of 21 April 1970 o: 1 the replacement of Member 
States' f manClal contr· ibutions with the Ccmnunity' s 
Oilll1 resources, 
- the harm:::-._ :-::!.tw:: of the sphere of application, the basic 
taxable a~,:-.1tr,:. ar.a the procedures for t.'1e collection of 
excise dut!es, particularly those which have an appreciable 
lnfluence 0~ traJe, and 
1 OJ c 28 of 27.3.1971 
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- further neasures fbr be harm:>nization of carpany taxation 
structures. 
Before the end of the first stage, the studies and the 
Cannission 1 s prc:p:>sals concerning the approximation of the 
rates of value added tax and excise duties shall be 
sul:rnitted to the Council. 1 
sane progress has been made to.Nards tax harrronization, partly 
as a result of initiatives of the kind just mentioned, and 
despite the numerous difficulties created by the considerable 
reluctance of each State to discuss taxation matters except 
within the confines of national legislation. 
TheStates have, for instance, retched agreement on a number 
of priority objectives such as: 
- the free rrovement of persons, g<X>ds, services and capital, 
- fiscal neutrality in trade, 
the introduction of nechanisms to guarantee that there is no 
distortion of competition, and 
- the abolition of tax frontiers. 
In practice, important results have been achieved on the 
basis of these objectives, particularly as the measures 
adopted to date mostly relate to the structure of taxation 
and basic taxable anounts. 
Despite the progress made, major differences still remain 
which call into quest1on the very principles on which 
the Ccmnunity is founded. This report will fran now on 
be concerned with one of those differences. 
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I 
B - Excise duties and Coomunity law 
Case 
Case 
Case 
Case 
An excise duty is an indirect tax on the manufacture or 
sale of certain products. The highest excise duties are 
levied on mineral oils, alcohol, beer and wine. 
Excise duties accoont for a substantial prcportioo of the 
tax revenue of all the Ccmnunity Mentler States; J.n effect, 
they are taxes v.hose yield depends on a specific rate 
(a nonetary arrount) and on the quantity of the product on 
which tax is collected. But why oo excise duties on wine 
create so ma~y problems for the Community - a solution to 
which is urgently needed - when they represent an area of 
taxation for which the Member State is in principle responsible? 
The answer to this question has been given by the Court of 
Justice on a number of occasions in its judgments in a series 
of cases involving the tax arrangements applicable to 
spirits in certain Member States1 . 
'Within the system of the EEC Treaty, the provisions of 
the first :md second paragraphs of Article 95 supplerrent 
the provisions on the abolition of customs duties and 
charges havmg equivalent effect. 'Iheir aim is to ensure 
free rroverrent of goods between the M:rrber States in normal 
conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms 
of protection which may result from the application of 
1nternal taxation which discr1minates against products from 
other Member States. Article 95 must guarantee the cc:rrplete 
neutrality of internal taxation as regar.ds carpetition between 
cbrestic proo'..lc<:s and i.'T'pOrted products. 
168;78 Carrnission v France 
169/78 Coomiss1on v Italy 
171/78 CarrniSSlOn V Den~k 
172/78 Commission v Ireland 
PE 79.978 ;fin. 2-
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'!he first paragraph of Article 95 must be interpreted widely 
so as to C0\1el" all taxation procedures which conflict with 
the principle of the equality of treatment of domestic 
products and i.rrp:>rted products; it is therefore necessary 
to interpret the concept of 'similar products' with 
sufficient flexibility. It is necessary to consider as 
similar products those which have similar characteristics ~~d ~eet 
the same needs fran the point of view of consuners. It is 
therefore necessary to determine the scope of the first 
paragraph of Article 95 on the basis not of the criterion 
of the strictly identical nature of the products but on that 
of their similar and carparable use. 
'!he function of the second paragraph of Article 95 is to 
cover all forms of indirect tax protection in the case of 
products which, without oeing similar within the meaning 
ofthe first paragraph, are nevertheless in competition, 
even partial, indirect or potential, with certain products 
of the i.rrp:>rting country. For the purposes of the application 
of that provision it is sufficient for the inported product to 
be in competition with the protected domestic production by 
reason of one or several econa:U.c uses to which it may be 
put, even ~~ough the condition of similarity for the purposes 
uf the first paragraph of Article 95 is not fulfilled. 
Whilst the criterion indicated in the first paragraph of 
Article 95 consists in the carparison of tax burdens, 
whether in terms of t.he rate, the rrode of assessnent or 
other detailed rules for the applkation thereof, in view 
of the aifficulty of making suffic1ently precise 
carparisons between the products in question, the second 
paragraph of that article is based upon a more general 
criterion, in other words the protective nature of the 
system of internal taxation. 
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Whilst Ccrrmunity law, as it stands at present, &:es not 
prohibit certain exerrptions or tax coocessions, in 
particular so as to enable productions or undertakings 
to continue which would no longer be profitable without 
those special tax benefits because of the rise in production 
costs, the lawfulness of such practices 1.s subject to 
the candi. tion that the Mertber States using those pa-ers 
extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and 
non-protective manner to in{lorted products in the 
sarre situation. 
'llle inplenentation of the prograrrrre of harm::mization laid 
down by Article 99 of the EEC Treaty cannot constitute a 
prel~nary to the application of Article 95. Whatever 
the disparities between the national tax systems, Article 95 
lays down a basic requirement which is directly linked 
~o the prohibition on customs duties and charges having 
an equivalent effect between the Member States in that it 
intends to eliminate before any harmonization all natio~ 
tax practices which are like1y to create discrimination 
against imported products or to afford protection to 
certain c:larestic products. Articles 95 and 99 pursue 
different objectives, since Article 95 aims to eliminate 
1n the immediate future discrirr~natory or protective tax 
practices, whilst Article 99 aims to reduce trade barriers 
arising from the differer.ces between the national tax 
systems, even where those are applied without discrimination.' 
C Excise duties on wine 
'lhe problem fZ)3ed by the tax arrangements for spirits 
\excise duty on alcohol) also arises in the case of wine, 
which is subject to markedly different regulations in 
the Member States both in absolute terms and in comparison 
with beer, its main competitor. 
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Table 1: catparison between the excise duties applicable to 
wine as at 1.4.1982 (ECU per hl) 
• 
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Source Commission of the EC 
- 17 - PE 79.978Ain. 2-
'1bat there are coosiderable differences between the rates 
awlied becanes ilmediately apparent fran this table. Jt>re 
iDportantly, it will be aeen that the Men'ber States can be 
divided into three gi'C:q)S: 
- group 1 : states applying zero-rated or very 1a.i excise 
duties (Italy, Germany, France and Greece) 
- group 2 states levying a m:derate rate of duty (Belqi\D, 
Luxeni:loorg and the Netherlands) 
- group 3 states levying very high excise duties (United 
Kingdan, Ireland and Dermark) 
Ux:lked at another way, it will be realized that of these 
groups the first carprises camtunity CCAJntries 'Which are 
wine-producers but 'Which also produce beer, the secood, 
countries 'Which, with very few exceptioos, are beer-producers 
and the third, countries which are exclusively beer-producers. 
Table 2: 'Ihe average trend of E~cise duties oo wine fran 
1.9.1979 to 1.4.1982 (1.9.1979 = 100) 
0 B OK F IRL I L NL UK GR 
84 89 230 302 77 104 168 ~ 
Source Commission of the EC 
'lllis table reveals that aver the past four years the United 
Kingcbn and Ireland have further increased their excise 
duties on wine, with the result that the cost to the consll'llei' 
has becane extrarely high - duty accounts for about 40% of 
the retail price of wine. 
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Clearly, such high rates of duty influence per capita 
consunption, so much so that, given the differences, it is 
possible to say that a direct relationship exists between 
the excise duty and cons\J'Iption. 
Table 3: Trends in per capita cons\lll)tion of wine over the 
decade 1969 to 1979 (in liters) 
Year D F I NL B+L UK IRL OK GR 
1969 16 
1979 25 
111 111 5 
96 82 12 
11 
19 
3 
7 
2 
3 
5 not known 
12 not knC1Wn 
Source : Commission of the EC 
On 5 December 1975 the Commission, aware of the repercussions 
on intra~ommunity trade in wine, addressed a rec~ndation to 
the Member States1 calling for a reduction of the excise 
dut1es pending the adoption of a harmonization directive. 
This recommendation had been disregarded, especially by the 
States belonging to the third, non-produc1ng group. 
D The action brought by the Ccmnission against the U:.i. ted Kingdan 
~1 ~ September 1978 the Commiss1on, faced w1th the continuation 
of an anomalous situation, initiated proceedings a~ainst 
the United Kingdom 1n pursuance of Article 169 of ~~ EEC 
TTeaty, the nature of the alleged 1nfringement be1~; that 
the national provisions relating to the excise duty on 
non-sparkling wines were contrary to the second pa:-agraph 
of Article 95 of the Treaty. 
On 27 February 1980 the Court of Justice reserved i~s right 
to study certain aspects of the case more thorough:~· before 
g1v1:-:g a final ruhng. 
1 76/2 in OJ L 2 of 7. l.l97f; 
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Why does the CCmnission consider that the excise duty regulations 
may be in breach of the second paragraph of Article 95 of the 
EEX: Treaty, which stipulates that 'no Ment:ler State shall :i.npose 
oo the products of other Merrber States any internal taxatioo of 
such a nature as to afford indirect protectioo to other products'? 
'D1e interpretation generally placed oo Article 95 is that cbtestic 
tax regulatioos must not be created with a view to erecting 
ci>stacles tl.' trade, not ooly in respect of inp::>rted products 
wch are identical to the dc:l1estic product, but also in respect 
of products wch are similar to or carpetitive with the 
domestic product. 
'lhe prohibition of fiscal discri.mi:1a.tion in Article 95 suffers 
no exception, must be regarded as a fundamental principle of 
the custans union and permits no argurrent for either conditional 
application or for subordinating it to interpretative criteria 
outside Cannunity rules. 
'lbe purpose of Article 95 is to guarantee the transparency of 
t.he market and the neutrality of taxation; it must be recognized 
that this irrposes limits on the fiscal sovereignty of the 
Mentler States. 
In the deposition submitted by the Commission in its action 
agninst the United Kingdom, the concept of competing product 
withln the meanwg of Article 95 must be underst<X>d as 
embracing a series of products which, without being identical 
or similar, are distinguished only by the degree and breadth 
of the differences separating them: the function and distribution 
of the products, their possibilities for use, the price 
differences bet···"=·~r. them and the econanic llnk between the 
respectlve sectors of production are just sane of the factors 
that must be considered when assessing the relationship 
between two potentially competitive products. 
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It is obvious that the substitution relationship may be real 
for certain cons\lners and only potential for others. 
'Dle camlissioo's contentioo, which should be supported by 
Parliament, is that this situatioo is confirned particularly 
~ the interpenetratioo of the markets is conditioned by 
fisc.: 1 systems \-ihich obstruct the free m::wement of goods; the 
ct>structioo is a major one when the taxation is so high that the 
inp?rted products becane luxury goods - which is what has 
hawened in the case of wine - and their consunption is thus 
limited to the social strata of the population which are 
best off - which cannot be condoned. 
Parliament should support the Commission's argument that the 
concept ot 'substitutionproducts' must be defined at Community 
level. Such a concept cannot be defined in the light of 
indi. vidual prefezences limited to selected rf~ions or by 
reference to a market not yet fully benefiting from the free 
movement of goods, without the principles of unifo~ity and 
equality of treatment laid down by the EEC Treaty being respected. 
E - The relationshlp between wine and beer 
The hlghest rates Of taxation On Wlne are applied by those 
countries which are not wine-producers but producers of beer, 
which explains why they ~k to use the fiscal system to 
discriminate in favour of the consumption of beer to the 
detriment of wine consumption. 
That a carpetit1ve relationship ex1st.s between wine and beer 
seems beyond dispute. '!he Ccmnission maintains - and rightly so -
that the quest1o~ of different places of production is irrelevant: 
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'The geographical distribution of production of beer and 
wine in the various regions of the c.arrnunity should facilitate 
and develq> trade. The place of production may of coorse 
exercise an influence in favour of the consurrption of local 
prodlcts but it cb!s not prevent an evolution of cons'l.lnel' 
preferenc:e t.c:Mards other products caning fran other regioos. 
The habits of coosumers vary in tenns of the q:p:>rtunities 
~ to them to get to know and appreciate products other 
than beer. 
Wine and beer share the sane characteristics: not only are 
they alcoholic drinks obtained by fermentation but they have 
the sane uses (table drinks and thirst-quenching drinks).' 
As far as danestic consUTption is cmcemed, \dne may be 
considered a substitutior. product for beer. 
r-t>reover, the taxation of beer poses fewer problems, especially 
since all the Member States are producers of beer, whereas only 
five are producers of wine. 
Table 4 : World output : v.·~.ne and oeer 
Beer* 
~-------------------------~~--------------------------~ 
Italy (lJ 
F~Ci..&iCe ~ 2 i 
C·r::-:1'1d.!'""~' \ 9 ~ 
Grf-·. ,. .. 3) 
Lu;.: :n.i:. ·,_;r-g ( 4 2 ) 
*the figures in brackets 
indicatf> the position 
occutJi.ed by eo.ch State I 
o~ the world productio~ 1 
Gennany (2) 
Cnited Kingdom (3) 
F:::-ance (9) 
Nether lands I 14 ) 
Belgium (15) 
lt.aly (20) 
D.::r .rr.ark ( 2 2 ) 
l.reland (27) 
'·H·ece t 39) 
.x,..:-:-tbc~r'J I:. 1 i 
:adder. • ~------------------------------- ------------------------· 
Sour~e: :o~~iss~on of tht EC 
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BEER 
- at 7°35 Plato 
- at 11 o Plato 
- at 12°5 Plato 
- at 13°75 Plato 
- at 16° Plato 
The excise duties levied by each Member State on the various 
types of beer were as follows at 1 April 1982 :(ECU/HECTOLITRE) 
B D ll< F G3 JR. I L N., ffi 
4.02-6.34 3.76-4,70 37.79 1,76 36.55 64.37 5.58 1.89-3,09 9.25-ll.GS ) 
6.02-9.49 5.01~.26 47.19 1,76 53,61 94.42 8,35 2,82-4,62 13,83-17,48 ) ) 23.24 
6,84-10.79 5,01~,26 47.19 3.12 60.92 107.31 9.49 3,21-5,25 15,71-19,89 ) 
7,53-ll~87 5.01~.26 56.01 3,12 67.02 118,03 10.44 3,53-5,78 17.~21-88 
8.76-13.81 7.51-9.39 56.01 3.12 n.'3JJ 137,34 12.15 4,ll~,72 20,11-25,45 
Source : Commission of the EC 
A ccrnparison in abs.Jl'-"te terms v.cu1d obviousli' be rreaningless. 
The rate of duty per volume or the rate of duty per degree 
of alcoholic strength can form the basis of a c~arative 
assessment, but 1n elther case the results always shaw wine 
to be at a disadvantage. 
In all its recent maJor reports, Parlia~nt has consistently 
called for the harmonization of excise duties on wine. 
) 
) 
) 
On 12 July 1983, the Court delivered 1ts judgment on what may well 
be one of the longest cases it has ever dealt with. The procedure 
for the case was opened by a letter of 14 July 1976 from the 
Commission initiating proceedings for the violation of Article 95(2) 
of the Treaty. Following its first interlocutory judgment of 
27 February 1980, the Court reached a final decision on 12 July 1983. 
This judgment is exemplary from several points of view and provides 
a clear and objective answer to all the q~estions raised during the 
hearings, which were summarized i~ the first part of this report. 
Competitive relatiorship between wine and beer 
With regard to the com~etitive relatic"ship betwee~ wine and beer, 
the Court ffiaintained that the two beverages 1n question were 'capable 
of meeting identical needs'. It must therefore be a~knowledged that 
there is a degree of substitution for ~~e another. 'For the purpose 
of measuring the possib~e degree cf s~:stituti,n, attention should 
- 23 - PE 79.978/ fin. :L 
-
not be confined to consumer habits in a Member .State ••• the tax 
policy of a Member State must not therefore crystalliz~ given con-
sumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage acquired by national 
industries concerned to respond to them.' 
Finally, after a detailed analysis of the various methods for com-
paring wine and beer, the Court decided in the final analysis that 
'the decisive competitive relationship between beer, a popular and 
widely consumer beverage, and wine Must be established by reference 
to those wines which are the most accessible to the public at large, 
that is to say, generally speaking, the lightest and cheapest 
varieties'; accordingly, that is the appropriate basis for making 
fiscal comparisons by reference to the alcoholic strength or to 
the price of the two beverages in question. 
Determination of an appropriate tax ratio 
Although this was the most delicate and most decisive aspect of the 
whole lengthy case, the Court, delivering its decision with great 
clarity, came to the conclusion that a considerably higher tax burden 
is placed on precisely those wines which, in view of their price, 
are most directly in competition with domestic beer production. The 
Court therefore reached the conclusion that 'the United Kingdom's 
tax system has the effect of subjecting wine imported from other 
Member States to an additional tax burden so as to afford protection 
to domestic beer production, inasmuc~ as beer productior. constitutes 
the most relevant referencf criteric~ from the point of view of 
competition. Since sue~ pro~ection is most marked in the case of the 
most popular wines, the effe:t of ~re United Kingdom tax system is 
to stamp wine w~th the hall~arks of a luxury product, which, in view 
of the tax bL•~den which it bears, can scarcely constitute in the eyes 
of the consumer = ger~'ne alternative to the typical domestically 
produced beverb~~.· 
On the basis of all these cons~dera~-~~s, the Court found the United 
Kingdom guilty of having fail~d to f~~fil i•s obligations under the 
second paragrap~ of Article YS o~ ~~= EEC 1·~aty, which ~as signed 
by the Government of the Unitpd ~~r;j~~ on 22 January 1972. 
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Conclusions 
In concluding this report it was necessary to mention the judgment 
of the Court and we have done so without offering any particular 
comments. In any case, the judgment is exemplary in its clarity. 
There is now a significant legal gap which the Community must fill. 
The situation as regards this domestic taxation system, which acts 
as a barrier to the free movement of goods, has now changed. A 
solution must be found and to this enj Parliament must press the 
Commission to pursue its efforts within the Council of Ministers to 
find an acceptable solution. Althoug~ it is improbable, given the 
strength of the beer lobby, that the price of wine will fall drastic-
ally in those countries in which it is over-taxed, it is vital to 
find a flexible and long-term solution in order to restore stability 
to the situation. The present report does not ~ish to take sides, 
only to see that justice, as expressed in the Cc~rt's reasoned 
judgment, is restored in the interests above all of the Community's 
consumers, between whom no discrimination should exist. Wine, which 
like beer is a popular beverage, should be accorjed equal treatment 
in the various countries of the Community and should not be considered 
a popular drink in so~e countri~s ~s a re~ylt in:er ali~ pf aid from 
the Community's agricultural policy, while in c:~ers it is considered 
a luxury product practicalLy inaccPssible to al, ~ut the most affluent 
grou~ sf consumers. 
In concLusion, in adopting this resolution ParL~o~ent must not only 
endorse the judg~ent of the Court of Justice b~: ~ust also lay the 
foundations for a solution to this problem, not o~Ly in the legal 
interest, which requires the governments to con~~~ with the rulings 
of t~e Court, but also in the interests of econ~-:= justice between 
the Me~ber States of the Community. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-18/81) 
tabled by Mr SUTRA, Mr GATTO, Mr FOTILAS, Mrs CRESSON, Mr ARFE, Mr CARIGLIA, 
Mr GEORGIADIS and Mr COUTSOCHERAS 
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure 
on taxes applicable to wine 
Ih~-~~r2Q~~o_e~rli~m~o! 
h<~ving regard to the II"•Otlon for u resolution on taxes applicable to wine 
and alcoholic beverages (Doe. 379/77), 
- having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the Council 
on problems posed by excise harmonization (COM(77) 338 final of 
27 July 1977), 
- hav1ng regard to the report of the Comm1ttee on Agriculture (Doe. 205/78), 
1. Has always been concerned at the effects the tax on wine has on con-
surrption in non-producing countries and at the cost of distilling and 
grubbing-up measures which, although they account for a smaller 
percentage of the EAGGF budget than the value of the wine in the 
European agricultural revenue, are nevertheless illogical because 
these amounts are spent to compensate for the under-consumption 
resulting from the excise duties; 
2. Points out that it delivered an expl1cit opinion in 1977 during the 
debate on the ~OFOED report which stated in paragraph 34 that it 
regarded as 1nadmissible the fact that some Member States, regardless 
of tf,f: Comrrission 's recommendations <md of the crisis on the wine 
marke~. are cont1nuing to put obstacles in the way of Community wine 
imports by impos1ng excise duties and other very high taxes on them; 
3. Consders the social and economic cost of the present grubbing-up policy 
too h~gh because it leads to the non-cultivation of certain regions 
of the Corr~~~ity; 
4. Points out that in s1ngle-crop and smallholding areas the wine-growers 
cannot grub up the vines and suffer a loss of identity and a loss of 
landed capital if they do not have the right to replant their vineyard; 
5. Not~s that, as shown in the reports by~~ GERLACH and Mr Ferruccio PISONI, 
the w.ounts levied as excise duties on wine can be regarded as negligible, 
espec1ally ~n relation to the collect1on costs; 
6. Notes also that the amounts currently lev1ed as excise duties could be 
broadly offset by the additional VAT revenue which would accrue from 
higher wine consumption and the necessary increase in producer prices; 
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7. cons1ders that the producers of wine, and especially of table wine, live 
in regions which are in any case the most sensit.ive in the commun1ty 
and that it lS intolerable that what is termed 'over-product1on' should 
be ellffiinated while at the same time the discriminatory policies of 
some Member States are leading to a clear 'under-consumption'; 
8. Notes that the menace of alcoholism is always less serious in wine-
producing and consuming areas than 1n regions where thls beverage is 
scarce: 
9. Requests the CoromlSSlOn to subn11 t new propos;•ls to ill.lol ish throu.,;hout 
the Corr.rnunlti' excise duties on wine mnd<' from fresh ~r.1pes origin.1t1nq 
in the Commun1ty; 
10. Instructs 1ts President to forw.1rd thl~ resolut1on to tne Council and 
the comrr.1ssion of the European Communities. 
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